408 research outputs found

    Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements

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    I present a simple and fast algorithm that finds all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with strategic complementarities. This is the first non-trivial algorithm for finding all pure-strategy Nash equilibria

    A short and constructive proof of Tarski’s fixed-point theorem

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    I give short and constructive proofs of Tarski’s fixed-point theorem, and of Zhou’s extension of Tarski’s fixed-point theorem to set-valued maps

    Correspondence Principle

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    Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

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    I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive class of games

    Contracts vs. Salaries in Matching

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    Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that govern many aspects of their interactions. I show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the assumption commonly used to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms

    A weak correspondence principle for models with complementarities

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    I prove that, in models with complementarities, some non-monotone comparative statics must select unstable equilibria; and, under additional regularity conditions, that monotone comparative statics selects stable equilibria

    Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

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    (less than 25 lines) I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a non-empty, complete lattice. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. The correspondence has a natural interpretation. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out---surprisingly---to be a very restrictive class of games.
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